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The Human Right to a Fair Start in Life
Matthew Hamity, Esq.*
ABSTRACT
This article tackles a reemerging debate between trial courts
and just about everyone else: can a judge condition an offender’s
early release or probation on successfully avoiding future
pregnancy? Wading into such controversial territory has its risks,
as Tennessee Judge Sam Benningfield discovered in 2017 when he
conditioned inmates’ early release on their having vasectomies or
long-term birth control implants. The order generated outrage
across the political spectrum, earning Benningfield a formal
reprimand from the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct and even
sparking a bill that would specifically prohibit any similar future
quid pro quo.
While the backlash to Judge Benningfield’s order in particular
is well deserved, his critics also reject wholesale the notion that
courts could ever be justified in conditioning probation or early
release on avoiding conception. This article stakes out new territory
in the debate, arguing that such orders may protect a child’s right
to a fair start in life without violating parents’ constitutional rights
nor their human right to found a family if (1) the offender may
choose the particular birth control method and (2) the orders only
apply to severe child abuse or neglect offenders during a limited
rehabilitative period.
Grounded in the foundational principle that parents known to
abuse and neglect children should not have more absent
rehabilitation, and cognizant of structural inequities of race, class,
gender, and national origin, the article presents a model “Fair
Start” order that may be implemented in courts across the country.
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The Human Right to a Fair Start In Life
I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 2017, Judge Sam Benningfield offered inmates in
White County, Tennessee, an unusual quid pro quo: 30 days’ credit
toward jail time for agreeing to a vasectomy or a contraceptive
implant. The judge’s proposition sparked public outcry as well as
several civil rights lawsuits on behalf of jailed inmates, and by
November the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct had formally
reprimanded Benningfield and eliminated the program. The
Tennessee state legislature soon followed with a bill to prohibit any
similar trading of birth control for early release.
That Judge Benningfield’s order was fatally flawed is clear,
being overbroad in its application, as well as unnecessarily
prescriptive by requiring that inmates submit themselves to a
particular medical procedure. However, critics dismiss not just
Benningfield’s own ill-conceived attempt at “preventing the birth of
substance addicted babies,” but also reject wholesale the notion that
courts could ever be justified in issuing orders that condition
probation or early release on avoiding conception. This article
contends that such outright dismissal is unfounded, occurring within
a pronatalist family planning framework that fails to acknowledge
(1) the irrevocable, lifelong harm inflicted upon children born to
abusive or negligent parents, (2) that the public child welfare system
is frequently no better, (3) that the parents themselves benefit from
avoiding pregnancy, having more time and resources to dedicate
toward rehabilitation.
This article further argues that “Fair Start Orders”—if modified
to simply proscribe conception (so that the offender chooses the
particular birth control method) and narrowly tailored to apply only
to serious child abuse or neglect offenders during a limited
rehabilitative period—may best protect a child’s right to a fair start
in life without violating parents’ constitutional rights nor their
human right to found a family.
II. THE GLARING NEED FOR FAIR START ORDERS
TO PREVENT ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF FUTURE
CHILDREN
In 2016, child protective services agencies (CPS) received an
estimated 4.1 million referrals for abuse and neglect involving
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approximately 7.4 million children in the United States.1 National
statistics, despite underreporting, 2 estimate that 1,670 to 1740
children die from parental or caregiver abuse and neglect in the U.S.
annually.3 In 77.6% of child abuse and neglect cases, the parents
are themselves the perpetrators.4
In cases where the child survives severe abuse or neglect, CPS
may remove the victim (and, under certain circumstances, their
siblings5) from the abuser’s custody. However, abusive parents have
carte blanche to conceive additional children, and those additional
children are also likely to suffer severe abuse and neglect, be it in
the home or upon removal to the public child welfare system.
A. SEVERE CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RECIDIVISM RATES
ARE HIGH, BOTH DURING REHABILITATION AND
AFTERWARD
In keeping with the national policy of family preservation,
substantial public resources have been dedicated to treatment
services for child abuse and neglect offenders so that they may retain
or regain custody of their children. 6 Nonetheless, the success of
these rehabilitative programs has been mixed at best, with studies
finding that more than one-third of offenders maltreated their
children during the treatment period; and over one-half of the
offenders were judged likely to mistreat their children following

1

Child Maltreatment 2016: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse
and Neglect Data System, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Children’s
Bureau.
2
Schnitzer, P. et al, Advancing public health surveillance to estimate child
maltreatment fatalities: Review and recommendations, Child Welfare, 92(2),
77–98 (2013).
3
Children and conflict in a changing world: Machel study 10-year strategic
review. New York: UNICEF (2009).
4
Child Maltreatment, supra note 1.
5
See, e.g., In re Baby Boy Santos, 336 N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence to terminate the parental custody
rights for a baby boy given the significant amount of abuse his sister had
suffered even though he had not personally suffered abuse); see also In re
Interest of M.B., 480 N.W.2d 160, 161-62 (Neb. 1992) (“If evidence of the fault
or habits of a parent or custodian indicates a risk of harm to a child, the juvenile
court may properly take jurisdiction of that child, even though the child has not
yet been harmed or abused.”).
6
Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating A Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective
Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60

2019]

The Human Right to a Fair Start in Life

113

completion of the program. 7 Worse yet, the more severe the
previous abuse or neglect, the more likely parents were to re-abuse.8
B. CONCEPTION OF ADDITIONAL CHILDREN ITSELF INCREASES
RISK OF RECIDIVISM AND INTERFERES WITH
REHABILITATION
With recidivism rates already high, social science data
indicates that subsequent pregnancies further increase the risk of
child abuse or neglect. 9 Courts, too, have acknowledged the
likelihood that the conception of additional children exacerbates
already abusive or negligent environments. 10 As a matter of
common sense, a parent convicted of severe neglect or abuse is
better equipped to focus on rehabilitation when he or she does not
have an additional infant to care for.
7

Anne H. Cohn & Deborah Daro, Is Treatment Too Late? What Ten Years of
Evaluative Research Tells Us,11 Child Abuse & Neglect 433 (1987); see also
Frequency of Child Maltreatment Recurrences Among Families Known to CPS,
3 Child Maltreatment 27 (1998), available at
http://cmx.sagepub.com/content/3/1/27 (reviewing forty-five maltreatment
recurrence studies and concluding that the rates for mid to high risk cases are
high, ranging up to over 50%).
8
Berkely Planning Associates, Child Abuse And Neglect Treatment Programs:
Final Report And Summary Of Findings From The Evaluation Of The Joint
Ocd/Srs National Demonstration Program In Child Abuse And Neglect 19741977.
9
See Lesa Bethea, M.D., Primary Prevention of Child Abuse, American Family
Physician, March 15, 1999, available at http://
www.aafp.org/afp/990315ap/1577.html risk factors for child abuse include ‘lack
of preparation for the extreme stress of having a new infant’ and ‘multiple
young children ‘); Samer S. El-Kamary et. al., Hawaii’s Healthy Start Home
Visiting Program: Determinants and Impact of Rapid Repeat Birth, Pediatrics,
Vol. 114, No. 3, Sept. 2004, at e317, available at http://
pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/abstract/114/3/e317 (finding that
families “already at risk for child maltreatment” mothers were likely to have
‘severe maternal parenting stress,’ ‘neglectful behavior’ and ‘poor warmth’
toward the new child when having a child within 24 months of a previous birth);
see also Richard L. Light, Abused and Neglected Children, 43 Harvard Educ.
Rev. 556 (1973) (noting that children in larger families have an increased
chance of being abused.)
10
See, e.g., V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *4 (‘[R]efraining from getting pregnant
again at this time will help enable this respondent to get her difficult life under
control so she can care adequately for her baby ....’); In re Appeal in Pima
County Juvenile Dependency Action No. 96290, 785 P.2d 121, 124 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1990) (“[t]he [trial] Court believes these are young parents who have been
overwhelmed by their rapidly expanding family and steadily diminishing
resources. The mother has had a tremendously difficult load to bear as
essentially the sole parent for the family because of the father’s alcoholism.”)
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C. THE WAIT AND SEE APPROACH CAUSES PERMANENT HARM
TO FUTURE CHILDREN
It is not uncommon for CPS to wait until a child has been
repeatedly abused before finally removing the child. In North
Carolina, for example, an investigation found that more than 120
children died in the state within a year of their parents or caregivers
being referred to a state agency; more than 30 of the children were
killed by being beaten to death, shot, drowned, smothered, or
poisoned by drugs. 11 In Florida, between 2008 and 2014, 447
children died of abuse or neglect after their families had come to the
attention of Florida’s Department of Children and Families 12
In those cases where the child survives the abuse, the delayed
intervention by CPS nonetheless causes irreparable harm: indeed,
even a single instance of child abuse can have long lasting effects,
including neurological dysfunction, learning and intelligence
deficiencies, poor language skills, and maladjustment to school.13
Moreover, one study found that 80% of young adults abused as
children met the criteria for at least one psychological disorder, and
about 30% of abused and neglected children will later abuse their
own children.14
And yet, the state’s reluctance to remove children from their
abusers is not without some justification since (1) the removals
themselves are traumatic (even for children with abusive or
negligent parents),15 and (2) abuse and neglect is widespread in the
state system as well.16 The recent opioid crisis in the U.S. has only
accelerated the problem: foster care cases involving drug-using
parents have hit the highest point in more than three decades of
Greg Barnes, Observer Investigation: Deaths point to crisis in NC’s child
welfare system, Fayetteville Observer (Sept. 23, 2017), available at
http://www.fayobserver.com/news/20170923/observer-investigation-deathspoint-to-crisis-in-ncs-child-welfare-system.
12
Innocents Lost: A Miami Herald I-Team Investigation, Miami Herald (Mar. 16
2014), http:// media.miamiherald.com/static/media/projects/2014/innocentslost/, archived at http://perma.cc/GU2S-LAK8
13
Harold P. Martin & Patricia Beezley, Behavioral Observations Of Abused
Children, In Child Abuse: Commission And Omission, supra note 1, at 436-38
(discussing characteristics of abused children).
14
See Child Help, National Child Abuse Statistics (2009). http://
www.childhelp.org/resources/learning-center/statistics#.
15
Catherine R. Lawrence et al.,The Impact of Foster Care on Development, 18
Development and Psychopathology 57, 58 (2006).
16
Children’s Advocacy Inst. & First Star, Shame on U.S.: Failings by All Three
Branches of Our Federal Government Leave Abused and Neglected Children
Vulnerable to Further Harm 29 (2015).
11
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record-keeping, accounting for 92,000 children entering an already
overburdened system in 2016.17
It is evident then, that once a child is born to abusive parents,
CPS’s role is largely one of determining which is the lesser of what
are undeniable evils: parental abuse, traumatic removal, and a
likelihood of abuse in state custody. It behooves us therefore, in
instances where the parent has already committed severe child
abuse, to intervene before an additional child is born. This Article
will argue for intervention in the form of a “Fair Start” order,
whereby courts may condition probation on avoiding conception
during a rehabilitative period in order to best protect a child’s right
to Fair Start in life.
III. THE FAIREST OF THEM ALL: TOWARD A
MODEL FAIR START ORDER
While Tennessee Judge Benningfield’s intentions may or may
not have been noble when he offered inmates early release in
exchange for their having a vasectomy or contraception implant—
having hoped to “prevent[] the birth of substance addicted babies”—
the glaring legal inadequacies of his order lent credence to the notion
that judicial intervention along these lines is “backward” and
“archaic” and “Neanderthal.”18 First, Benningfield’s proposal was
overly broad, being applied to all inmates rather than narrowly
tailored so as to apply only to those with convictions for “severe
child abuse and neglect.” 19 Second, Benningfield proscribed the

17

Number of children in foster care continues to increase, U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services, (Nov. 30, 2017), available at
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/media/press/2017/number-of-children-in-foster-carecontinues-to-increase; see also Sharon Balmer, From Poverty to Abuse and Back
Again: The Failure of the Legal and Social Services Communities to Protect
Foster Children, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 935, 939 (2005) (noting that the foster
care system in this country amounts to what one court called a “lost generation
of children whose tragic plight is being repeated every day.” (quoting LaShawn
A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
18
Joe Patrice, Prison Snips Sentences If Inmates Snip… (Yes, We’re Talking
About Vasectomies), Above the Law (July 20, 2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/prison-snips-sentences-if-inmates-snip-yeswere-talking-about-vasectomies/.
19
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(22) (“Severe child abuse” means:
(A)(i) The knowing exposure of a child to or the knowing failure to protect a
child from abuse or neglect that is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death
and the knowing use of force on a child that is likely to cause serious bodily
injury or death;
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particular method of birth control in the form of a vasectomy or
long-term contraception implant, when the same result could
theoretically be achieved through less invasive measures such as
condoms, birth control pills, or abstinence, all of which are less
likely to harken back to sterilization’s sinister, racist history.20
Just months after Benningfield’s order, on February 8, 2018, a
federal judge in Oklahoma issued a shorter sentence to a defendant
as “the benefit of her decision to be sterilized.” 21 While the
sterilization “decision” may have been her own, it was decidedly not
her idea: the judge had advised that defendant that at her upcoming
sentencing hearing for passing a counterfeit check “she may, if (and
only if) she chooses to do so, present medical evidence to the court
establishing that she has been rendered incapable of procreation”
Yet this judge did not receive the same public backlash and
professional criticism that Judge Bennington did,22 perhaps in part
because his order targeted a defendant who had already relinquished
parental rights to six of her seven children after an Oklahoma
Department of Human Services investigation found she had
“fail[ed] to protect the children from harm” and had used cocaine
and methamphetamine during much of that time.23
(ii) “Serious bodily injury” shall have the same meaning given in § 39-15402(d).
(B) Specific brutality, abuse or neglect towards a child that in the opinion of
qualified experts has caused or will reasonably be expected to produce severe
psychosis, severe neurotic disorder, severe depression, severe developmental
delay or intellectual disability, or severe impairment of the child’s ability to
function adequately in the child’s environment, and the knowing failure to
protect a child from such conduct”).
20
See In re Bobbijean P., 2 Misc. 3d 1011(A), 784 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Fam. Ct.
2004), adhered to, 6 Misc. 3d 1012(A), 800 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Fam. Ct. 2005),
and order vacated in part, 46 A.D.3d 12, 842 N.Y.S.2d 826 (2007) (“It is
important to note that the court is not directing what steps the mother should
take in order to not get pregnant, or what steps the father should take in order
to not get any woman pregnant. Practices are available to avoid or prevent
pregnancies consistent with personal and even religious beliefs. There are a
great variety of birth control methods available.”)
21
Findings At Sentencing at 5, United States v. Creel, CR-16-189-002-F.
22
The lack of backlash may be attribute in part to Friot’s status as a federal,
rather than state, judge, since federal judges are not directly beholden to voters,
being appointed rather than elected.
23
Id. at 3-4. (Still, there were problems with Judge Friot’s order, including his
gratuitous reference to the defendant’s children being “out of wedlock” and the
somewhat cavalier tone he adopted in challenging the government’s contention
that consider[ing] Creel’s voluntary sterilization procedure in determining a
sentence” might violated her fundamental constitutional right to procreate,
retorting, ““the Supreme Court has yet to recognize a constitutional right to
bring crack or methamphetamine addicted babies into this world.” Judge Friot
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Indeed, a plurality of courts have found a compelling state
interest sufficient to overcome even strict scrutiny when the
defendant has exhibited a pattern of repeatedly neglecting or
abusing his or her existing children, assuming the order is applied
for a limited rehabilitative period. 24
In a landmark case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin approved
as constitutional a court order preventing a recidivist defendant from
having children until he was able to care for them.25 Similarly, in
State v. Kline, an Oregon appellate court held that a drug-using and
physically abusive father could be prohibited from conceiving a
third child until he had completed drug-treatment, anger
management and counseling programs, and had received the court’s
written approval lifting the no-conception ban.26
New York’s highest court has gone so far as to note that
“parental ‘rights’ are not so much ‘rights’, but responsibilities....” a
principle that a subsequent court relied upon in concluding that “a
parent has the responsibility to rear his or her children, but not an
unlimited right to bear children irresponsibly.”27 And in California,
legislative authorization of procreative restrictions as conditions of
probation were specifically envisioned in the case of People v.
Zaring.28

also failed to describe in detail the facts involved in defendant’s failure to
protect six of her children from harm—this kind of order requires a detailed
factual records as justification).
24
Whether or not strict scrutiny would actually be applied remains an open
question, since “the sweeping references to the procreative right in modern
substantive due process cases are dicta….” Carter Dillard, Child Welfare and
Future Persons, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 367, 416 (2009); see also I. Glenn Cohen, The
Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1135, 1141
(2008) (“American constitutional jurisprudence appears to treat the right to be
and not to be a gestational parent (still in the non-interference sense) as
conjoined. But this bundling is not inherent.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1149-50
(“Griswold thus emphasized the invasion of the marital ‘space,’ not the
interference with procreative decisions per se as the harm . . . .”)
25
State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 74
(2002).
26
963 P.2d 697, 699 (1998).
27
In re V.R., 6 Misc. 3d 1003(A) (Fam. Ct. 2004) (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40
N.Y.2d 543 (1976)).
28
8 Cal. App. 4th 362, 374, 10 Cal. (1992).
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A. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR A MODEL FAIR START ORDER
i. Orders should be rehabilitative rather than punitive
“Termination statutes by their very nature, are prospective and
predictive . . . . Their purpose is not to punish parents for past
behavior, but rather to prevent future harm to children by
interpreting past behavior as indicative of future parental
unfitness.”29 Fair Start orders should operate the same way, and this
can be achieved by requiring completion of rehabilitative treatment
in conjunction with the procreative restriction. Some commentators
seem to presume that Fair Start orders and rehabilitative treatment
are somehow mutually exclusive.30 On the contrary, as previously
discussed, the procreative restrictions themselves help facilitate
rehabilitation by allowing the offender to focus time and energy on
treatment rather than care for a new child.
ii. Orders should be issued in cases of “severe child abuse,”31
preferably as a replacement for “no custody” orders
Recognizing that “requir[ing] [a] child to suffer the fate of his
[severely abused] siblings prior to termination of parental rights
would be a tragic misapplication of the law”32; that “to wait until
injury to decide issue of health and development of child makes no
sense,”33 ; that “require[ing] a child to suffer abuse in those cases
where mistreatment is virtually assured is illogical and directly
averse to society’s fundamental policy of preserving the welfare of
29

Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic
Violence on Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84
Calif. L. Rev. 757, 786 (1996)
30
See Steven M. Berezney, Zablocki Reborn?: The Constitutionality of
Probation Conditions Prohibiting Deadbeat and Abusive Fathers from
Conceiving Children, 5 J. L. Society 255, 309–10 (2003) (“Abusive fathers like
Kline should also be rehabilitated instead of prohibited from procreating. A
procreation ban for several years will not cure anger management problems. In
cases like Kline, courts should first condition probation on successful
completion of several anger management and other related courses in hopes of
rehabilitation. Until abusive fathers get their emotions and anger under control,
they will continue to beat their wives and children long after their
probation expires.”).
31
Supra note 19, defining “severe child abuse” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1102(22).
32
In re Interest of J.A.J. (Mo.App.1983), 652 S.W.2d 745, 749.
33
New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. A.W. (1986), 103 N.J. 591, 616,
512 A. 2d 438, 451, at fn. 14.
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its youth,” 34 ; courts have upheld termination of parental rights
before a particular child has suffered any specific injury on the basis
that the harm caused to his or her sibling evinces a substantial risk
that he or she will suffer a similar fate.35
Several states go a step further, allowing for the termination of
parental rights at birth because the parents’ severe neglect and abuse
of previous children was sufficient to demonstrate a “substantial risk
of harm” to the infant.36 In California, for example, if a parent causes
the death of a child through abuse or neglect, they are presumed unfit
as to all future children, making a child’s removal at birth via “no
custody” order highly likely, and all but guaranteed if the offender
has an additional child before he or she has time to be rehabilitated.37
While the same logic that supports “no custody” orders would
seem to support “fair start” orders as well, courts have held that
probation orders prohibiting procreation are not “reasonably related
to future criminality” because they are in fact redundant with “no
custody” orders.38 Such reasoning is fundamentally flawed since (1)
it incorrectly assumes that children are not harmed by having been
raised in the public system, in direct conflict with the state policy’s
Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1991).
See generally, Karen S. Kassebaum, The Siblings of Abused Children: Must
They Suffer Harm Before Removal from the Home?, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1547
(1996).
36
See, e.g., In re N.H., 889 A.2d 727, 727 (Vt. 2005) (discussing family court
order permitting removal of newborn from mother whose parental rights with
respect to four previous children had been terminated by courts in three different
states); In re K.C.H., 316 Mont. 13, 17 (2003) (rejecting argument that actual,
not prospective, abuse or neglect is required for a child to be deemed a “Youth
in Need of Care,” buttressed by the statutory language providing that a
“substantial risk of harm to a child’s health or welfare” constitutes child abuse).
37
Adrienne McKay, Termination of Parental Rights in California: Why A
Temporary Prohibition on Conception Would Have Better Served Ethan N., 35
Sw. U. L. Rev. 61, 72 (2005).
38
See, e.g., Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(“[A]lthough this condition of probation could reasonably relate to future
criminality-i.e., child abuse-it could do so only if appellant had custody of the
child or was permitted to have contact with the child. In this case, however,
those possibilities have already been foreclosed….by the other valid conditions
of probation.”); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979)(“[W]e hold that the condition prohibiting custody of children has a clear
relationship to the crime of child abuse and is therefore valid. The conditions
relating to marriage and pregnancy have no relationship to the crime of child
abuse, and relate to noncriminal conduct. Possibly these conditions could relate
to future criminality, if the marriage or pregnancy resulted in custody of minor
children who could be abused. But we hold that the conditions are not
reasonably related to future criminality, since such custody of minor children is
already prohibited by the valid condition directly addressed to custody”).
34
35
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in favor of maintaining the family unit; (2) fails to account for the
resulting burden on the already struggling public welfare system (as
well as the taxpayer)39; and (3) fails to prevent pre-birth harms to
future children in the case of substance-abusing mothers or abuse
fathers who commit violence against pregnant mothers.
Furthermore, scholars have argued that the removal of newborn
infants from parents is far more intrusive than temporarily
prohibiting would-be parents from procreating.40
One way to get around courts’ flawed reasoning is through
legislative authorization of Fair Start orders, since doing so changes
the test applied in determining the validity of the probationary
conditions. In Florida, for example, in enacting a statutory
authorization of Fair Start orders would transform them from
“special conditions” of probation to “general condition”; “general
conditions” need only to be “rationally related to the State’s need to
supervise the defendant regardless of whether the condition is
reasonably related to the defendant’s offense….”41
iii. Legislative authorization of Fair Start orders should explicitly
account for the principles of affirmative action, and structural
inequities of race, class, and gender.42
One the one hand, there is good reason to be wary of any policy
that contemplates limitations on procreative rights, given the racist,
sexist, and classist history of state efforts to limit procreation
through eugenics programs and other population control efforts.43
On other hand, “[t]he past application of morally reprehensible
policies designed to restrict reproduction does not entail the
wrongness of any and all attempts to regulate procreative behavior,
39

Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Child Abuse and
Neglect Cost the United States $124 Billion (Feb. 1, 2012).
www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2012/p0201_child_abuse.html.
40
Joan Callahan, Contraception or Incarceration: What’s Wrong with This
Picture?, 7 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 67, 75 (1996); Joseph R. Tybor, Does
Sterilization Fit the Crime? Woman Must Decide, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1988,
at 4C (quoting law professor Daniel Polsby): “The state takes kids away from
unfit parents all the time. What is proposed here is not
the taking away
of children that actually exist, but those who don’t exist and, arguably, that’s
less invasive than removing a natural child from its parents.”
41
Brock v. State, 688 So. 2d 909, 911–12 (Fla. 1997).
42
See Section III infra, for discussion of Fair Start Orders and gender.
43
Kendra Huard Fershee, The Parent Trap: The Unconstitutional Practice of
Severing Parental Rights Without Due Process of Law, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev.
639, 651 (2014).
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especially behavior that constitutes flagrant disregard for the welfare
of offspring.”44
It should go without saying that institutional racism, classism,
and sexism are far from being relics of the past. For starters, the
broader criminal justice system consistently favors the white and the
wealthy. 45 Additionally, the child welfare system itself has been
criticized for persistent racial and class bias.46 One study found that
that child abuse was less likely to be recognized in white children
from two parent families than children from Black and single-parent
families.47 Scholar Dorothy Roberts concluded that prosecutions of
drug-addicted pregnant Black women “are better understood as a
way of punishing Black women for having babies rather than as a
way of protecting Black fetuses.”48
Nonetheless, recognizing the glaring flaws of the existing
system cannot justify throwing up our hands and allowing the most
vulnerable among us to be abused and neglecte. As family law
scholar Naomi Cahn notes:
The racism and sexism of the criminal justice system, however,
do not mean that children are not getting hurt— children are being
44

See Pearson, supra at fn. 8.
See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System
Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 261, 267-72 (2007); Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution:
Toward A Color-Conscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1541, 1549 (2012); Dan M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of
Megan’s Law, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1535 (2004).
46
Susan Brooks & Dorothy Roberts, Family Court Reform, 40 Fam. Ct. Rev.
453, 453 (2002); Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced
Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications
for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
L. 299, 299, 309-10 (2013) (noting that because of poor women’s perceived
failure to conform to traditional expectations of motherhood, they are subjected
to heightened forms of scrutiny by medical staff and more often referred to law
enforcement for investigation.); but see Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating A ChildFriendly Child Welfare System: Effective Early Intervention to Prevent
Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 Buff. L. Rev. 1323, 1327
(2012) (noting studies that found that while “black children were, in fact,
maltreated at much higher rates than white children, as would be expected given
socioeconomic differences between black and white families and other
established predictors for maltreatment…official reporting and removal rates
closely tracked actual maltreatment rates, indicating that while there might be
pockets of discrimination within the system operating in different racial
directions, there was no overall pattern of discrimination”).
47
Carole Jenny, M.D. et al., Analysis of Missed Cases of Abusive Head Trauma,
281 JAMA 621, 621 (Feb. 17, 1999).
48
Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the
Meaning of Liberty (1997).
45
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neglected, abused, and killed by their caretakers. Childhood, while
the topic of elegiac moralizing, is nonetheless deprivilegizing
because children simply cannot speak for themselves.49
Indeed, child abuse and neglect prosecutions are unique from
prosecutions for other criminal offenses, since, in the vast majority
of cases where the offender is a person of color and/or a poor person,
the victim is as well. Consider also the evolution of domestic
violence policy over the last decades: many of the same racial and
class biases affect the way in which domestic violence is prosecuted,
with feminist scholars having identified how aggressive policing of
domestic violence disproportionately affects people of color.50 And
yet, “despite the drawbacks of excessive criminalization and
separation, the feminist revolution of DV law has brought
significant benefits to many women”51; the same is necessarily true
of Fair Start orders and the potential benefits to future children saved
from neglect and abuse.
Short of abolishing the current criminal justice system
entirely, 52 what is left is to navigate the current version to best
protect the most vulnerable among us, and poor children of color in
particular in manner that does not discriminate. In order to protect
against class discrimination, legislative authorizations of Fair Start
orders should include a poverty exemption in cases of neglect,
53
which should in tern help to prevent orders being used as tools of
49

Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of
Criminalization, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 817, 825 (2000)
50
Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources,
and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1047 (2000).
51
Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the “Child Maltreatment
Revolution”?, 19 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 40 (2017).
52
See Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of
Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 261
(2007). This article does not take a position one way or the other on the merits
of total abolition, but it does presume that the current system will remain in
operation for the foreseeable future.
53
A minority of states and the District of Columbia already include a poverty
exemption in their definition of child abuse and neglect. Ark. Code Ann. § 1218-103(14)(A)(Ii); D.C. Code § 16-2301(9)(A)(Ii); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
39.01(30)(F); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2202(D)(1); La. Child. Code Ann. Art.
603(18) (2014); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-C:3(Xix)(B) (2014); N.D. Cent.
Code Ann. § 27-20-02(8)(A); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6304(A); Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 261.001(4)(B)(Iii); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.44.020(16); W.Va.
Code Ann. § 49-1-3(11)(A)(I); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.02(12g).
For example, the District of Columbia’s statute for child abuse and neglect states
that “[t] he term ‘negligent treatment’ or ‘maltreatment’ means failure to
provide [a child with] adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, which
includes medical neglect,
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racial oppression, since people of color make up a disproportionate
number of the nation’s poor. Orders should also heed calls for
“color-conscious” law enforcement and prosecution. 54
Orders should leave the method of birth control to the
discretion of the parent55
B. A MODEL FAIR START ORDER
Plaintiff, v. Defendant.

Case No. _________________ Judge ________________ JUDGMENT ENTRY
MODEL ORDER ADDITIONAL CONDITION[S] OF
[COMMUNITY CONTROL/PROBATION]

Adults possess a presumptive right to conceive children. This
right diminishes when one has borne one or more children and
severely abused or neglected them. The right may be suspended
temporarily to fulfill the state’s compelling interest in protecting
future children, and to protect defendant’s interest in successful
rehabilitation. Defendant’s criminal conviction for child
maltreatment is clear evidence of unfitness to parent at this time. To
release Defendant into the community now would risk creating a
situation in which another child is in danger of similar maltreatment
at Defendant’s hands. That risk is sufficient reason for the state to
refuse Defendant’s request for [community control/probation].
Thus, this court operates within its proper discretion by granting
Defendant’s request only conditionally, contingent upon
Defendant’s acting to avoid that risk, as it might do with any other
risk posed by a convicted criminal.
As an additional condition of [community control/probation]
this court hereby orders Defendant to avoid [impregnating a
woman/becoming pregnant] during the duration of the [community
control/probation] period.
Violation of this order will result in [extension of the
[community control/probation] period, and order requiring
and the deprivation is not due to the lack of financial means of his or her parent,
guardian, or other custodian.” See D.C. CODE § 16-2301(24).
54
See generally Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward A
Color-Conscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1541, 1541 (2012).
55
See supra, note 43.
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community service, revocation of probation and additional actions
by this court to ensure the Defendant’s rehabilitation, etc.]
This order is reasonably related to Defendant’s offense, risk of
future re-offense, and necessary rehabilitative efforts, which will
require devoting substantial time to counseling and other services
targeting Defendant’s demonstrated propensity for maltreating
children.
This order serves the State’s compelling interests in preventing
harm to future children. Further, this order in no way requires or
condones abortion in the event of a pregnancy during the course of
the order’s applicability.
This condition is effective upon service of a copy of this order
upon Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
IV. FAIR START ORDERS AND FEMINISM
Philosopher John Stuart Mill lamented a century and a half ago
that “misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the
part of parents from being recognized, and legal obligations from
being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former
always, and in many cases for the latter also.” 56 According to Mill,
the state’s responsibility necessarily extended to prospective
children as well because, “to bring a child into existence without a
fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but
instruction and training for its mind is a moral crime, both against
the unfortunate offspring and against society.”57
Given that studies continue to link child abuse to poor family
planning, 58 as well as the egregious failure of our after-the-fact
public child welfare systems, 59 Mill’s argument resonates even
more strongly today. And yet, major organizations such as Amnesty

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 103 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1978) (1859).
57
Id.
58
Kai Guterman, Unintended pregnancy as a predictor of child maltreatment, 48
Child abuse & neglect 160-169 (2015).
59
Children’s Advocacy Inst. & First Star, Shame on U.S.: Failings by All Three
Branches of Our Federal Government Leave Abused and Neglected Children
Vulnerable to Further Harm 29 (2015).
56
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International,60 and the Center for Reproductive Rights,61 insist that
procreative rights must always be absolute and unlimited, even
when that unlimited right all but ensures that a child will be born to
grossly negligent or abusive parents.62
The refusal of otherwise progressive organizations and thinkers
to even consider the interests of children may be traced to the
conflation of the rights to have and not have children, which is itself
a corollary of a conflation of the pronatalist status quo with
feminism. Indeed, commitment to absolute procreative rights has
become a “moral bulldozer” that invariably “crushes all competing
interests,” even when those interests include a future child’s
fundamental interest in avoiding severe abuse and neglect.63
A. THE FEMINIST CASE FOR ISSUING FAIR START ORDERS TO
BOTH MEN AND WOMEN
“From a feminist perspective, unlimited procreative liberty
risks treating children as property, distorts understanding of the
family, and neglects moral concerns about how we reproduce.” 64
That is, “to confuse procreative with non-procreative sexual
interaction, and to assume that the same rules apply in both sorts of
cases, is to ignore the obvious fact that procreation leads to the
existence of a child whose interests must be considered and whose
creation will have an impact on society.”65
As a result of the conflation of the rights of nonprocreation and
procreation, the right to procreate is “one of those moral rights that
has been more assumed than argued for…where procreation is
60

Amnesty international, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/sexual-andreproductive-rights/ (“Sexual and reproductive rights mean you should be able
to make your own decisions about your body and:….decide if you want to have
children and how many”).
61
Center for Reproductive Rights,
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/RRa
reHR_final.pdf (listing among the twelve human rights key to reproductive
rights “The Right to Decide the Number and Spacing of Children”).
62
One scholar has gone so far as to argue that children can never be harmed by
being born, regardless of the brutality of the conditions in which they enter the
world. See David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People 61
(1992).
63
Laura M. Purdy, Children of Choice: Whose Children? At What Cost?, 52
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 197, 199–202 (1995).
64
Maura A. Ryan, The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist
Critique, Hastings Center Rep., July-Aug. 1990, at 6.
65
Pearson, Yvette E. Storks, cabbage patches, and the right to procreate.
JOURNAL OF BIOETHICAL INQUIRY Inquiry 4.2 (2007): 105-115, 109.
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widely understood as being so fundamental to human existence—
individually or as a species—that it does not require any argument
in its defense.66 And linking the right to procreate so closely with
the concept of the self and identity can be dangerous, as bioethicist
Laura M. Purdy notes:
[T[his model of the self encourages people to see the decision
to have children primarily as a personal decision about themselves
and not as a moral decision affecting others. This moral dimension
of childbearing is obscured by the emphasis on self-creation, which
makes it almost impossible to discuss, let alone construct, moral
standards. Thus, it is hardly possible to talk about such matters as
wrongful life or overpopulation without seeming to violate the
individual’s most intimate self.67
For the same reason that “the legal concept of privacy can and
has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and women’s
exploited labor,”68 absolute procreative freedom frequently protects
the interests of those more powerful parties to the procreative
equation.69 In this way, feminist theory regarding the operation of
power dynamics practically begs for Fair Start orders as a means of
protecting future children from abusive men and women, with
children being the most vulnerable and “subordinated” group.70
B. THE FEMINIST CASE FOR ISSUING FAIR START ORDERS
SOLELY TO MEN
The early versions of Fair Start orders targeted mostly women,
both because, biologically speaking, it is easier to verify a female
probationer’s compliance with the order, and because women are
66

Id at 106.
Purdy, supra note 63.
68
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
101 (1987); see also Jean L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal
Paradigm (2002) (noting the inadequacy of a privacy concept that merely
ensures the right to be let alone, as it fails to protect the more vulnerable groups,
and calling instead for a formulation of privacy as a “fundamental right to equal
liberties”).
69
See. Ryan, supra note 64 (“From a feminist perspective, unlimited procreative
liberty risks treating children as property, distorts understanding of the family,
and neglects moral concerns about how we reproduce”).
70
See, e.g., Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the “Child Maltreatment
Revolution”?, 19 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 41 (2017) (positing that the feminist
critique of family privacy would seem to highlight the role that the state’s family
preservation efforts and noncriminal intervention play in children’s
subordination and therefore maltreatment).
67
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almost six times more likely than men to be custodial parents.71 As
a result, there are simply many more opportunities for women to
neglect their children than for men. 72 This disparity is then
exacerbated by the fact that the justice system tends to hold mothers
to a higher standard than fathers because of ingrained societal
expectations that mothers should bear the responsibility for
childrearing. 73
And yet, despite spending substantially less time on average
caring for children than women, men are nearly twice as likely to
commit criminal acts of violence against their children.74 Worse yet,
“male battering of women often escalates during pregnancy and
causes more birth defects than all the diseases for which children are
commonly inoculated. 75 As a matter of biology, men have the
capacity to conceive more children than women, such that an
abusive man could father several children during even a short
probationary period. These distinctions between men and women
could likely justify limiting Fair Start Orders to male probationers
under intermediate scrutiny.76
From a theoretical standpoint, one could also reasonably argue
that only men truly enjoy absolute procreative rights in our
patriarchal, pronatalist society, and therefore, that the case for
placing some limitation on procreative rights is strongest as to men.
That is, even if ostensibly free to choose whether to have children
and in what amount, women still reside in a patriarchal system that
favors reproduction over delayed childbearing and childlessness.77
71

Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of
Criminalization, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 817, 819 (2000).
72
Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting
Negligent Parents, (Wake Forest University School of Law Research Paper
Series No. 05-08, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=673451.
73
Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race,
and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584
(1997) (“When fathers are involved in the proceedings, they are usually subject
to lower expectations and are significantly less likely to be criminally charged
with neglect or passive abuse of their children”).
74
See, e.g., Demie Kurz, Corporal Punishment and Adult Use of Violence: A
Critique of “Discipline and Deviance”, 38 SOC. PROBS. 155, 159 (1991);
Leslie Margolin, Beyond Maternal Blame: Physical Child Abuse as a
Phenomenon of Gender, 13 J.Fam. Issues 410, 418-19 (1992).
75
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective
on Parents’ Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1766 (1993) (citing Nancy Gibbs,
‘Til Death Us Do Part, TIME, at 38, 41 (Jan. 18, 1993).
76
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976).
77
See Paddy McQueen. Autonomy, age and sterilisation requests. J. OF MED.
ETHICS (2016).
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Logically, the dangerous effects of patriarchy and power do not
suddenly disappear with unlimited procreative rights, and it is no
wonder then, that “those who do not wish to mother are often treated
with disbelief or viewed as slightly pathological when they claim to
want a ‘childfree’ life.” 78
In truth, absolute procreative rights, as filtered through
patriarchy, ends up promoting a woman’s choice only when it
corresponds with a man’s preference: in this upside down,
pronatalist framework, a 29 year old woman, for four years, was
unable to find a doctor willing to sterilize her in accordance with her
desire not to procreate (under the guise of protecting her from a
decision she might later regret), 79 whereas a child-bride receives
IVF treatment at a major university hospital center (under the guise
of “respecting the patient’s mentality and cultural norms”). 80
Moreover, why are we more concerned that an adult who chooses to
be sterilized might someday come to regret the decision81 (thereby
affecting the welfare of zero children), than we are that a teenager
who permanently creates another life might someday wish she had
waited until she was fully mentally developed herself, particularly
since children with older mothers—regardless of their parents’
background, education and finances—have fewer behavioral, social
and emotional problems?82
Given the nuanced arguments that may be raised on both sides,
this Article leaves open the question of whether Fair Start orders
78

Kristin J. Wilson. Not trying: Reconceiving the motherhood mandate. Georgia
State University, 2009; see also Laurie Lisle, Without Child: Challenging the
Stigma of Childlessness 235 (1999) (observing that “[a]s long as a female is
young and unmarried, her childlessness is unquestioned, even honored, since she
represents the virgin archetype. When it is a matter of considered choice,
however, the reaction is often different. The attractive lover of man, the
Aphrodite or mistress type, is usually tolerated. But a nullipara who is old,
isolated, or angry, or who is not sexual or maternal, runs the risk of being
regarded as an anti-mother or an imperfect male and being cast out of the human
family”).
79
Brockwell, Holly, The Guardian, “Why can’t I get sterilized in my 20s,”
January 28, 2015.
80
Callaway, Ewen, New Scientist, “Interview: Why I gave a teenager IVF,” (May
9, 2008), available at https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13867-interviewwhy-i-gave-a-teenager-ivf/ (last visited March 19, 2019).
81
In fact, studies have shown that IVF can work after sterilisation.
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ivf-baby-possible-after-tubalsterilization/ (last visited March 19, 2019).
82
Tea Trillingsgaard, Dion Sommer. Associations between older maternal age,
use of sanctions, and children’s socio-emotional development through 7, 11, and
15 years. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 2016; 1 DOI:
10.1080/17405629.2016.1266248
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should issue solely for men. Jurisdictions may reasonably decide
one way or the other, so long as they do so with an awareness of the
ways in which sexism and patriarchy will necessarily affect, and
frankly, infect, the way in which procreative rights are exercised.
V. THE MODEL FAIR START ORDER ACCORDS
WITH THE HUMAN TO FOUND A FAMILY
Under Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Covenant recognizes “[t]he right of men and
women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family.” The
United Nations Human Rights Committee notes that, “the right to
found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and
live together.”83 Given that one has procreated after having a first
child, the Committee interpretation should reasonably imply a
limited right, such that the right to found a family does not include
the right to have as many children as a person wishes (particularly
after having neglected or abused previous children); the limiting of
the right to found a family necessitated by the balancing of other
human rights in the Covenant appear to support such an
interpretation.
As a preliminary matter, unlike other rights contained in the
Covenant, the right to found a family can be derogated, see art. 4,
and lacks the stipulation common to other rights that it not be
unlawfully restricted. See e.g., art. 22 ¶¶ 1-2 (stipulating, in the
context of “the right to freedom of association with others,” that
“[n]o restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other
than those which are prescribed by law”). The right to “found a
family” under the Covenant is even further limited by competing
rights and correlative duties as declared in article 5: “Nothing in the
present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is
provided for in the present Covenant.”); see also Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 29, 30 (recognizing that rights
must necessarily be limited by others’ rights and by the general
welfare).
83

U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 19, art. 23 (Thirtyninth session 1990) in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 107, U.N. Doc.
HR1/GEN/1/REV. 4 (2000).
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Chief among these competing rights in the Covenant is article
24(1), which entitles every child “to such measures of protection as
are required by his status as a minor on the part of his family, society
and the State.” As the Committee notes in its General Comment on
Article 6, these “special measures of protection…should be guided
by the best interests of the child, by the need to ensure the survival
and development of all children, and their well-being.” The
Committee also recognizes in its General Comment that the right to
life for children and adults alike “depends on measures taken by
States parties to protect the environment against harm and
pollution.”84
Since the right “to found a family” must be interpreted so as
not to abrogate competing rights, it must therefore be balanced
against the prospective child’s right to life. Human rights are all
constructed and limited in order to improve human wellbeing, not
diminish it, which is why the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights specifically recognizes that one person’s rights may be
limited by others’ competing rights and/or in the interest of the
general welfare.
In contrast to ICCPR Article 23(2)’s vague and arguably satiable right “to
found a family,”
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo
men (“CEDAW”)requires signatories to ensure that men and women have “[t]he
same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their
children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable
them to exercise these rights.”159 However, the modifier “responsibly”
necessarily demonstrates that any such right is not unlimited. See also
Dillard, Prospective Parents and the Children’s Rights Convention, 25 Am. U.
Int’l L. Rev. 485, 523 (2010) (arguing that “CEDAW does not create any new
rights, but rather seeks to bolster rights already provided by the UDHR, ICCPR,
and ICESCR.Put more simply, CEDAW should not be interpreted as creating a
broader right to procreate for women than that enjoyed by men, but should
instead be read as establishing parity between the two genders.”). In other
words, CEDAW itself recognizes that absolute procreative freedom does not
exist in a vacuum, but it fails to meaningfully address the problem.
As for nonbinding sources of international law, they, too, appear to implicate a
broader procreative right than “founding a family,” but these nonbinding sources
also qualify a parent’s right to have as many children as she wishes by
specifying the manner in which that right should be exercised. See United
Nations: Report of the International Conference on Population and
Development, UN Doc No A/CONF.171/13, Cairo, Egypt, 5–13 September
1994 (18 Oct 1994) (“In the exercise of this right, they should take into account
the needs of their living and future children and their responsibilities toward the
community.”); see also Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International
Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968)(“ Parents have a basic human right to determine
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children…”) (emphasis
added).
84
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In this way, the Model Fair Start order is best understood as a
balancing mechanism that best protects all human rights, as opposed
to some brazen attack on procreative rights. And balancing is sorely
needed, with one commentator going so far as to subordinate a
child’s interest in avoiding neglect and abuse to the ticking
biological clocks of older child abusers, 85 and others, while
acknowledging the high recidivism rates among perpetrators of
child abuse and neglect, insisting that because recidivism is less than
100%, the true danger lies in the possibility that the probationer
would erroneously be deprived of the right to procreate during the
rehabilitative period (contemplating that or she may have turned out
to be within the minority of offenders that would not have abused or
neglected the additional child).86
VI. FAIR START ORDERS AS A STEPPING STONE
TO A LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS BASED FAMILY
PLANNING MODEL
In the United States, the patriarchal preference for women as
reproductive vessels is reflected in specific pronatalist policies,
particularly of late, among them defunding teen pregnancy
programs, severely limiting family planning abroad, and rolling
back the ACA birth control mandate, which disproportionately
harms poor women and women of color.87 Within this pronatalist
framework, absolute procreative rights may easily be transformed
into tools that actually hurt those most vulnerable by restricting

85

See Joanna Nairn, Is There A Right to Have Children? Substantive Due
Process and Probation Conditions That Restrict Reproductive Rights, 6 Stan. J.
Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties 1, 31–32 (2010) (lamenting the effect of temporary
procreative restrictions on “probationers who are at the upper end of
reproductive age when sentenced will be unable to have children by the time
their sentence ends,” as well as decrying that “[s]ome women, determined to
have additional children despite the inability to do so during their probationary
period, might even face increased health risks as they seek to maintain a
pregnancy at a later age.”)
86
Emily Campbell, Birth Control As A Condition of Probation for Those
Convicted of Child Abuse: A Psycholegal Discussion of Whether the Condition
Prevents Future Child Abuse or Is A Violation of Liberty, 28 Gonz. L. Rev. 67,
102 (1992) (acknowledging, “[w]hile it is true that predictive ability of less than
100% is not necessarily constitutionally suspect…the cost to the parent is great
because she will be denied the right to have additional children.”)
87
Melissa Murray, Intimate Choices, Public Threats—Reproductive and LGBTQ
Rights under a Trump Administration, 376.4 New England Journal of
Medicine 301-303 (2017).
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women to traditional gender roles,88 exacerbating income inequality
with a glut of cheap laborers,89 and depriving future generations of
children a fair start in life.
Fortunately, despite the predominance of the pronatalist family
planning framework, there is a growing recognition of a need for
policies that focus on delayed childbearing, and smaller families in
particular, both as investments in the environment,90 investments in
the economy,91 and investments in children.92 And since it is in the
context of serious child abuse and neglect cases that the horrific
consequences of pronatalism become most stark, it is in this context
that widespread norm change is most likely.
Of course, such a foundational change in the way we plan
families will require a multipronged approached. Thus, advocacy for
Fair Start orders should be accompanied by calls – including by
courts – for specific legislation, funding, and resource reallocations
that address the underlying problem in family planning: The need to
eliminate inequality in a way that moves towards giving every child
a fair start in life, with opportunities equal to the opportunities
enjoyed by other children in their generation. This could include, for
example, a guaranteed minimum income for children 93 and the
establishment of trust fund for each child born to low-income
parents, as well as increased investments in more progressive family
planning measures such as long-acting reversible contraception
88

Judith Blake, Coercive Pronatalism and American Population Policy: Judith
Blake. International Population and Urban Research, University of California,
in: Ellen Peck and Judith Senderowitz, eds., Pronatalism. The myth of mom and
apple pie (Thomas Y. Crowell, New York (1974).
89
Jacquelin Thomsen, Wisconsin state lawmaker suggests banning abortions to
add to labor force, The Hill (Nov. 4, 2017), available at
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/358806-wisconsin-statelawmaker-suggests-banning-abortions-to-add-to
90
Jiang, Leiwen, and Karen Hardee. “How do recent population trends matter to
climate change?.” Population Action International (2009).
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_5720/jiang_hardee_2009.pdf
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Bongaarts, John, and Steven W. Sinding. “Family planning as an economic
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